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Introduction
In recent decades, Mali has been confronted with several 
crises and armed conflicts, with serious implications for 
the security, political and socio-economic situation, as well 
as for human rights and humanitarian conditions. Armed 
conflict erupted again in early 2012, as noted by the UN 
peacekeeping mission,1 stemming from structural problems 
like ‘weak State institutions; ineffective governance; fragile 
social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities 
in the north of being neglected, marginalized and unfairly 
treated by the central Government; a weak and externally 
dependent, albeit vibrant, civil society; and the effects of 
environmental degradation, climate change and economic 
shocks.’. Mali was hit by a coup d’état by military officers in 
March 2012, while Tuareg rebels and Islamic armed groups 
simultaneously seized control of Northern Mali. 
Since these events, the country has been in the grip of armed 
conflict and political turmoil, plunging it into a deep crisis 
that has alarmed the international community. When Islamic 
armed groups such as Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity 
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) advanced southwards in January 2013, this 
led to a military intervention by the French forces and the 
deployment of the African-led International Support Mission 
to Mali (AFISMA). Peace negotiations aimed at achieving an 
accord between the Malian government and armed groups 
followed, unfortunately without success. Then, on 1 July 
2013, AFISMA was replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission: 
the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) . Until today, the lack of a peace agreement and the 
ongoing conflict have posed severe challenges to MINUSMA. 
Based on field research conducted in Mali during 2013 and 
2014 as part of the Sahel project funded by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence, this policy brief highlights some of 
the main challenges faced by the MINUSMA, and indicates 
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1 MINUSMA. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali. http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml
2 Ibid.
its opportunities as regards supporting the achievement of 
Mali roadmap goals – including inclusive political dialogue, 
national and local reconciliation, democratic governance, 
protection of human rights, and protection of civilians.3  
  
MINUSMA’s Mandate and Capacity
MINUSMA officially deployed to Mali on 1 July 2013. Based 
on Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, the UN 
peacekeeping mission was to ‘support the transitional authori-
ties of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementa-
tion of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population 
centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human 
rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, 
the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, 
inclusive and peaceful elections’.4 A rocky first year and dete-
riorating security situation showed that the mission required 
greater capacity as well as a more robust mandate. Hence, on 25 
June 2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) renewed 
and amended the mandate by unanimously adopting Resolu-
tion 2164. The new mandate focuses on duties such as ‘ensur-
ing security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting 
national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the 
reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the secu-
rity sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights’. 
Notably, the UNSC requested MINUSMA to expand its presence 
in Northern Mali beyond key population centres such as Gao 
and Timbuktu, with the aim of improving the physical protec-
tion of civilians. As a result, over 80 per cent of all MINUSMA 
staff and 90 per cent of uniformed personnel are now based in 
the northern regions.6 Additionally, MINUSMA’s efforts at the 
3 During 2013/2014, interviews were conducted with MINUSMA leader-
ship, military, police and civilian staff, and UN DPKO. In addition, inter-
views were conducted representatives of the Malian government, security 
forces, civil society, and population, as well as various international or-
ganizations present in Mali.
 4 MINUSMA Mandate. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/mi-
nusma/mandate.shtml. For further information, see United Nations S/
RES/2100.6 United Nations S/2014/692.
5 MINUSMA Mandate. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/mi-
nusma/mandate.shtml. For further information, see United Nations S/
RES/2164.
6  United Nations, S/2014/692.
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political level remain a key priority, in particular the facilitation 
of inclusive peace talks.7   
In order to achieve its goals, MINUSMA has been working 
together with the Malian government and its security and 
defence forces, the French forces, the European Union Train-
ing Mission (EUTM), EUCAP Sahel Mali, UN agencies, the 
humanitarian community in Mali, and a range of other local 
and regional organizations. Given the particularly fragile 
security situation and activity of armed groups, the mission 
operates under robust rules of engagement. Thus, MINUS-
MA’s mandate allows for the use of ‘all necessary means to 
address threats to the implementation of its mandate, which 
would include protection of civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence and protection of United Nations person-
nel from residual threats, within its capabilities and its areas 
of deployment.’8 So far, MINUSMA has an authorized strength 
of 12,640 uniformed personnel, of which 11,200 military 
and 1,440 police. However, on 28 February 2015 the mission 
had not yet reached full deployment, with only 8,831 military 
personnel, 1,052 police and approximately 1,000 local and 
international civilian personnel deployed in Mali.9  
MINUSMA’s Challenges
Ever since its deployment, MINUSMA has faced a complex set 
of challenges that have prevented the mission from achieving 
its full potential and successfully implementing its mandate. 
One of the main challenges concerns mission capacity: even 
though MINUSMA has a robust mandate, it needs more per-
sonnel and greater material capacity in order to be able to 
implement this mandate. Interviews with MINUSMA’s leader-
ship indicated that the mission faces a lack of commitment 
by UN member states to contribute troops. Partially because 
of high security risks and asymmetric attacks from armed 
groups in Northern Mali, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) 
have been extremely cautious regarding areas to deploy to. As 
a senior MINUSMA staff member explained, ‘TCCs see Mali as 
training ground. Most of the TCCs are not willing to expose 
their troops to the security threats in Northern Mali and run 
the risk of getting them back in body bags. There are a number 
of caveats coming from the capitals, limiting the possibilities 
for deployments in Mali.’10 Ever since its start-up phase the 
mission has suffered from a lack of staff as well as technical 
and logistical support. This has implications for MINUSMA’s 
ability to tackle the deteriorating security situation, which 
currently poses severe threats to its personnel and the civil-
ian population in Mali. The lack of a comprehensive peace 
agreement and heightened activity by various armed groups 
has made Mali into one of the most complex settings for a 
UN peacekeeping operation.11 Trying to combat these armed 
groups, MINUSMA has been involved in military operations 
against insurgent and extremist groups alongside the French 
military operations ‘Serval’ and ‘Barkhane’, and the Malian 
army.12 This has led to direct reprisal attacks against the UN 
mission. According to UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, these reprisal attacks 
have turned MINUSMA into the deadliest UN mission, ‘peace-
keepers face assaults on a virtually daily basis, in the form 
of rocket attacks on bases and targeted attacks with impro-
vised explosive devices’.13 As of February 2015 the mission 
had experienced 46 fatalities, and over 100 Blue Helmets 
had been wounded in reprisal attacks, while peace negotia-
tions have still failed to find a comprehensive solution.14 The 
increased risks induced by the mission’s lack of impartiality 
may also scare away some of the major TCCs.15 In addition, 
interviews conducted with MINUSMA leadership indicated 
that TCCs are less willing to deploy their troops to high-risk 
areas, as many lack the support, training background, and 
capabilities for forceful action against insurgent groups.
A further challenge is the lack of infrastructure throughout 
the country, causing delays in the distribution of supplies and 
material, building camps and hence deployment of troops. 
When the mission deployed there were very few facilities 
available, so entire camps had to be shipped into the country. 
The lack of transport planes and helicopters has forced the 
mission to transport much of its material and personnel by 
road, with the poor infrastructure causing significant delays in 
deployment. This is especially the case in the northern regions 
of the country, giving armed groups the chance to thrive in an 
area that already has little to no state control. 
Despite some innovative efforts by MINUSMA to stabilize the 
conflict, the security situation has deteriorated in Northern 
Mali since early 2014. Insurgent groups affiliated with al-
Qaeda have stepped up their terrorist activities. Many armed 
groups now show signs of fragmentation,16 making it more 
challenging to assess threats. In addition, rocket, suicide and 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) attacks, abductions, and 
inter-communal violence are increasing. Although the current 
mandate addresses some of the complex issues UN forces face 
on the ground, peacekeeping doctrine does not provide much 
guidance in this situation. Guided by an ambitious mandate 
and limited military capabilities, MINUSMA has little room for 
manoeuvre in an environment which poses serious security 
risks to its personnel. To sum up: ‘with a decrease in security 
and no progress in negotiations, let alone in dialogue or recon-
ciliation, MINUSMA is moving further rather than closer to the 
implementation of its mandate’.17 Overcoming these challenges 
12 Security Council Report, ‘Mali : October 2014 Monthly Forecast,’ 30 
September 2014, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-fore-
cast/2014-10/mali_14.php.
13 United Nations News Centre, ‘Peace Process in Mali at ‘crucial Stage’ UN 
Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council,’ 6 January  2015, http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49740#.VMkQ8C4X4x-.
14 United Nations News Centre, ‘With Mali Peace Talks Set to Resume, Secu-
rity Council Urges ‘Spirit of Compromise’, 17 October  2014, http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49110#.VEUVpMm5T5M; United 
Nations News Centre, ‘Mali: Ban Voices “outrage” as UN Peacekeeper 
Killed in Second Deadly Attack This Month’, 8 October 2014, http://www.
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=49028#.VE46S8m5T5M.
15 Richard Gowan, ‘Diplomatic Fallout: Frustrations Mount for India at the U.N.’, 
World Politics Review, 15 April 2013, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ar-
ticles/12870/diplomatic-fallout-frustrations-mount-for-india-at-the-u-n.
16 For further information, see Morten Bøås (2014), ʻGuns, money and prayers: 
AQIM’s blueprint for securing control of Northern Maliʼ, CTC Sentinel, 7(4): 1-7.
17 Emmanuel Bombande and Peter van Tuijl (2014), ‘Can MINUSMA’s Man-
date Include the People of Mali? | IPI Global Observatory,’ IPI Global Ob-
servatory, 24 June, http://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/06/minusma-
mandate-include-people-mali/.
 7 United Nations, S/RES/2164.
 8 MINUSMA. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Mali. http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml 
 9 MINUSMA: Facts and Figures. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mis-
sions/minusma/facts.shtml
10 Interview with senior UN staff member, MINUSMA Headquarters in Bama-
ko, May 2014
11 A UN-brokered preliminary peace deal was signed by the Malian govern-
ment in March 2015. However, the proposed peace deal was rejected by 
the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA), on the grounds that it did 
not reflect the aspirations of their people in northern Mali, and needed 
to be discussed further. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/16/us-
mali-talks-idUSKBN0MC0WD20150316
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will require revised doctrinal guidance and new practices that 
put the peacekeeping principles under considerable strain.
Disapproval and mistrust from the Malian population as well 
as complex working relationships with the Malian authori-
ties and security forces add further complexity to the situa-
tion. Differing views on the way forward have led to a tense 
relationship between the Malian government and MINUSMA 
leadership. In a recent interview, a senior MINUSMA official 
said that ‘limited commitment by the government to estab-
lish dialogue and reach a political solution with the parties 
in Northern Mali hampered progress towards a peace agree-
ment and further complicated the working environment for 
MINUSMA’.18 Another key concern is how to prevent the UN 
mission from becoming a tool for the Malian government to 
clear out armed groups, with no ensuing political dialogue 
with populations in the North. Mali’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Abdoulaye Diop, recently requested the UN Security 
Council to consider the establishment of ‘a rapid intervention 
force capable of effectively combating terrorists’.19 At the same 
meeting, Hervé Ladsous stated that ‘the lack of Malian secu-
rity forces in the northern part of the country has created a 
situation where, in effect, MINUSMA is the main international 
presence on the ground. That makes us a target for all those 
spoilers – extremists, jihadists and traffickers – who would 
like to have the ground exclusively to themselves so as to be 
able to continue their nefarious activities.’20  
 
Furthermore, by supporting one of the conflicting parties, 
MINUSMA is caught in a counter-insurgency logic where it is no 
longer just a question of protecting the population from vio-
lence but also of winning their support and trust alongside and 
in support of the Malian government. MINUSMA aims to sup-
port the process of the Malian state’s return to Northern Mali. So 
far, the mission has not made progress in this respect. In fact, 
the population of Northern Mali expressed serious concerns 
regarding their safety and security in relation to MINUSMA’s 
presence on the ground, resulting in violent demonstrations 
against the mission. Several residents of Gao moved away from 
areas close to the MINUSMA base, for fear of being attacked by 
armed groups.21 MINUSMA’s ineffectiveness has been utilized 
by insurgent groups, as violence has been used to make the 
population turn against the mission. Being close to MINUSMA 
is perceived as increasing the risk of being attacked, and many 
residents expressed the wish to see the mission leave.22 The 
lack of protection has further worsened relations between the 
government, population, and MINUSMA, leading to stalling 
peace talks and lack of political dialogue. 
As MINUSMA is a multidimensional mission with a large 
humanitarian component, humanitarian assistance is part 
of its mandate as well. This has proven to be a challenging 
task. The increasing number of attacks by insurgents in Mali 
has brought greater risks for the humanitarian community, 
and casualties among NGO staff.23 All this has complicated 
the dynamics within MINUSMA. Parts of the humanitarian 
community are very hesitant when it comes to collaborating 
with MINUSMA. As a representative of the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) observed: 
…the humanitarian community in Mali generally finds 
it problematic to work with MINUSMA due to different 
views on the use of armed escorts. As a general rule these 
organizations only approve the use of armed escorts as a 
last resort and they have a strict no weapon policy. This 
makes the cooperation with the military component of 
MINUSMA quite difficult as they advocate a different view. 
In addition to that many of the humanitarian organizations 
are not comfortable associating with MINUSMA as the 
armed groups increasingly target the mission. Besides their 
principle of remaining neutral and impartial actors, the 
humanitarian community does not want their own staff to 
be exposed to the risks of working alongside MINUSMA.24 
 
Ever since its deployment, the mission has been confronted 
by internal challenges as well. Interviews with military, police 
and civilian personnel indicated that many staff members 
have experienced problems regarding MINUSMA’s leadership. 
In most cases this was due to the lack of communication with 
staff, and the impression that leadership focused most of its 
attention on external players and factors. Staff also felt there 
was no clear strategy or vision, as well as a lack of guidance 
from MINUSMA’s leadership. This led to confusion about job 
responsibilities and rapidly decreasing motivation amongst 
personnel. As the mission consists of a range of different 
nationalities and cultures, with different norms, values, and 
work ethics, this has often led to problems related to cross-
cultural issues and misunderstandings.
In addition, short-term contracts were often used for person-
nel, leading to either a lack of commitment or encouraging 
rivalry, as people felt they had to defend their turf and fight 
to get their contracts renewed. Interviews indicated that the 
resultant knowledge drain and the need to constantly train 
new recruits was frustrating for MINUSMA’s personnel and 
placed additional strains on the already limited capacity of the 
mission. Training in itself was a major challenge: many TCCs 
had not provided their troops with specific training to face ter-
rorist groups, resulting in a lack of preparedness and ability. 
In-mission, staff felt that training was not well organized by 
MINUSMA. For many it was unclear how the system works, 
and there was not sufficient time available to participate 
in training. When in-mission training did take place, many 
participants experienced a lack of commitment, often due to 
short contracts with the mission and varying language skills. 
Interviews indicated that limited language skills of MINUS-
MA’s personnel have also led to communication problems, 
making it difficult to improve relations with the local popu-
lation. Many Troop- and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs 
and PCCs) have deployed staff who lack proficiency in French. 
Relatively few people in Mali speak English, complicating the 
working relationship with the Malian government, security 
forces as well as the relationship with the general public.
Opportunities and Recommendations
MINUSMA is currently facing several challenges that prevent 
the mission from achieving its full potential and implement-
24 Interview with OCHA-representative, Bamako, May 2014.
18 Interview with senior MINUSMA official in Mali in 2014.
19 United Nations, S/PV.7274.
20 Ibid.
21 Interviews with residents of Gao in 2014.
22 Findings from interviews the author conducted with residents of Northern 
Mali in 2014.
23 Jan Egeland, ‘Northern Mali Risks Becoming Forgotten Protection Crisis’ 
(Norwegian Refugee Council, June 19, 2014).
4Policy Brief
Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading 
independent research institute on international 
politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian 
foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of 
Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless 
operates as an independent, non-political 
instance in all its professional activities. 
Research undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-
term applied research to more long-term basic 
research.
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ing its mandate. Many of these are related to the deteriorating 
security situation in Mali, the lack of a peace agreement, dis-
approval and mistrust on the part of the Malian population, 
complex working relationships with the Malian authorities 
and security forces, internal problems within MINUSMA, a 
lack of capacity due to insufficient numbers of personnel as 
well as technical and logistical support, and the unreliable 
infrastructure in the country. The mission’s main opportuni-
ties lie in the creation of a security umbrella that would enable 
negotiations to take place in order to reach a peace agreement, 
better leadership, trust-building initiatives with the Malian 
population, improved collaboration with the Malian govern-
ment and security forces, and better preparation, training and 
guidance of its staff. On the basis of interviews with MINUSMA 
leadership, mission staff, UN DPKO representatives, as well as 
representatives of the Malian government, security forces, civil 
society, population, and various international organizations 
present in Mali, it is therefore recommended that:
• MINUSMA should continue to work towards a peace agree-
ment with the involved parties of the conflict in Mali, in 
order to create an environment in which MINUSMA can 
fulfil all aspects of its mandate. Specific attention should be 
paid to northern Mali in order to enable MINUSMA to oper-
ate in these areas safely.
• MINUSMA should ensure that facilities, technical and logis-
tical support are available in order to actualize deployments 
and enable implementation of the mandate.
• Trust-building efforts should be stepped up, to improve 
collaboration with key stakeholders as well as the local 
population. Greater emphasis should be given to inter-
cultural communication and cooperation skills when 
training of staff that are (to be) deployed to MINUSMA. 
Trust-building concerning the Malian security and 
defence forces is essential to improve relations between 
MINUSMA and the Malian authorities. 
• In addition, MINUSMA should prioritize the restoration of 
confidence in the mission on the part of the Malian govern-
ment and the populace, in order to increase the mission’s 
capacity and ability to fulfil its mandate. MINUSMA should 
increasingly interact and communicate with the Malian 
population, particularly in the northern regions. In view of 
the deteriorating security situation, it is essential to build 
relationships based on trust and to retrieve and share infor-
mation with the Malian population, the government, and 
the country’s security and defence forces.
• As MINUSMA lacks the capacity to offer extensive in-mission 
training, it is important for staff to arrive as well prepared as 
possible. Context-specific pre-deployment training should 
be offered in order to prepare for potential confrontations 
with terrorist and insurgent groups.
• Language skills should be thoroughly tested by TCCs and 
PCCs before officers are recruited and deployed to MINUSMA, 
language training should be offered to those recruited who 
are yet not proficient in French. In mission it is important to 
take language skills into account when tasks are assigned. 
In particular, training tasks should be assigned according to 
proficiency, in order to prevent loss of capacity and impact. 
• Coordination efforts should be improved and needs assess-
ments be conducted, in order to prevent overlap and dupli-
cation of activities between MINUSMA, its partners and 
international organizations – a problem currently under-
mining the already scarce capacity of MINUSMA.
• Technical and logistical support should be increased, 
particularly in the northern regions. The development of a 
reliable infrastructure between Bamako and northern Mali, 
as well as throughout the northern regions, is necessary for 
MINUSMA and the Malian security and defence forces to be 
able to perform properly. 
• Communication between MINUSMA Headquarters in Bamako 
and the mission’s regional offices should be improved and 
made more regular, to enable  information-sharing, the 
development of realistic strategies and sharing of lessons 
learned/best practices. In addition, communication within 
the mission as well as with external partners should be 
improved. This would increase awareness of the efforts being 
made by the mission, in turn fostering better relations with 
the Malian population. Within the mission this should lead 
to greater clarity regarding leadership and strategy, and a 
better understanding of staff roles and responsibilities.
• TCCs and PCCs should use officers who have served their 
term in MINUSMA to brief staff to be deployed to the mis-
sion. Such sharing of expertise and experience is likely to 
contribute to better preparation, better expectation man-
agement and improved risk analyses, in turn facilitating the 
development of higher morale among MINUSMA staff.
